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 Do workfare programmes reduce
educational attainment? Evidence
from India
Workfare programmes have become an
increasingly common form of social transfer.
From 2007-2009, the World Bank alone funded
workfare programmes in 24 different
countries. While they offer a valuable safety
net to households in lean times, workfare
programmes can also produce unintended
effects. Looking at the case of NREGA in India,
today’s blog argues that a better
understanding of ‘price effects’ is needed to
improve targeting and reduce trade-offs to
education.
Much of the popularity of workfare programmes stems from
the fact that they are self-targeting. Only individuals willing to
work (hard), and sufficiently in need of work, will accept low
wages and sign up to receive the subsidy. Workfare
programmes are also intended to prevent dependency. As better
labour market opportunities arise, participants will turn away
from public works. Programmes may also increase private
sector wages, thereby further increasing incomes of the poor.
India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA),
passed in 2005, provides a legal guarantee of up to 100 days of
annual employment at the statutory minimum wage rate to
rural households willing to supply manual labour for local
public works in a financial year. The Act mandates equality of
wages for men and women and that one-third of programme
beneficiaries are to be women. It is operationalised through the
National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS),
which began in 2006.  In 2009-10, approximately 53 million
households across India were beneficiaries of NREGS. The
required budgetary outlay was approximately Rs. 40,000 crores
(over 6 billion US dollars), making it one of the best-endowed
social programmes in India.
NREGA provides jobs, not just payments.
Imbert and Papp (2015) show that NREGS increased rural
wages about 5 percent which suggests that NREGA acts as a
positive shock to labour demand in villages. The programme
affects the opportunity cost of time even for people who are not
allowed to work directly for the programme, like teenagers.
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allowed to work directly for the programme, like teenagers.
From previous work, we know that the opportunity cost of time
is an important determinant of investment in education. For
example, our own work shows that when rainfall is high and
rural labour market opportunities are abundant, people invest
less in education or ‘human capital’ development of older
children; others have shown similar patterns from factory
openings in Mexico and fracking and housing booms in the
U.S.  Thus, if workfare programmes are raising wages and
changing the opportunity cost of time in school for adolescents,
there could be knock-on effects for a household’s education
decisions.
…when rainfall is high and rural labour market
opportunities are abundant, people invest less in
education or ‘human capital’ development of older
children ”
In a recent working paper, “Workfare and Human Capital
Investment: Evidence from India” we examine the effect of
NREGS on human capital outcomes. We take advantage of the
phased rollout of the programme over three years to identify the
causal effect of the programme on human capital. We measure
human capital using the 2005-2009 Annual Status of Education
Report (ASER) data.  ASER annually tests over 500,000
children between the ages of 5 and 16 from almost 600 rural
districts in India in basic literacy and numeracy skills.  We use
test scores in math and literacy as well as current enrollment
rates and age for grade as measures of human capital.
We find that after controlling for natural differences between
study settings and time periods, in villages exposed to NREGA,
adolescents aged 13-16 score lower on math tests, and are less
likely to be enrolled in school. For readers interested in the
econometrics, we used district and year fixed effects to find that
adolescents exposed to NREGA score .02-.05 standard
deviations lower on math tests than adolescents not living in
NREGA villages.
Figure 1: Effect of years of exposure to NREGA on enrollment and
math scores
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…in villages exposed to NREGA, adolescents aged
13-16 score lower on math tests, and are less likely to
be enrolled in school. ”
Figure 1 shows that each additional year of exposure from
2006-2009 decreases math scores for 13- to 16-year-olds by 2
percent of a standard deviation and enrollment rates by 2
percentage points.
For older children, less time in school means more time in
work
To understand the mechanisms behind these effects, we turn to
the National Sample Survey (NSS) data, a large household
survey on employment and consumption.  These data confirm
our findings from the ASER—when NREGS rolls out, children
are 3 percentage points less likely to report school as their
“primary activity”. What are they doing instead? Interestingly,
boys report increases in market work, but girls report increases
in domestic work at home—the exact type of work their
mothers are switching out of when NREGS comes to the
district.
Interestingly, boys report increases in market work,
but girls report increases in domestic work at home—
the exact type of work their mothers are switching out
of when NREGS comes to the district. ”
We do find a silver lining, however. Consistent with previous
research on the positive effects of income on young children’s
human capital, we find that exposure to the programme before
age 5 is associated with higher test scores and enrollment rates.
 Since the programme is less than ten years old, we don’t yet
know how it will affect overall educational attainment over the
long-term, but it is possible that those exposed to the increased
income from the programme while young, will be less likely to
drop out in the future.
Factoring in ‘price effects’ can improve social
programming design
In its first four years, we estimate that NREGS caused between
650,000 and 2 million adolescents to drop out of school.  While
this is an important effect for long-term economic growth, it
should not be taken as a complete condemnation of this
programme, or others like it. This analysis represents the effect
of NREGS on one particular outcome that may be of interest to
policymakers (human capital investment). While we would
argue that this is quite an important outcome for economic
growth, we are not measuring any of the potential benefits that
the programme provides in terms of consumption, protection
against income shocks, or any number of other welfare
outcomes. Thus, we are not in a position to measure the overall
welfare impact of this particular anti-poverty programme.
Rather, the takeaway from these results is that social
programmes have ‘price effects’ meaning that they affect
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programmes have ‘price effects’ meaning that they affect
and impact the market value and demand for labour. These
price effects have very real consequences. If workfare
programmes raise prevailing wages and cause older students to
substitute toward work and away from school, lump sum
grants or conditional cash transfers might be alternative options
to consider. Ultimately, it is important to understand these price
effects so that social programmes can be designed to better
maximise their potential to increase economic growth and
alleviate poverty.
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